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Juvenile Curfews and Fundamental
Rights Methodology
BY CALVIN MASSEY*

In the 1990's, juvenile curfews became popular with municipal
legislators. However, they were not greeted enthusiastically by all
juveniles, and as a result, the constitutional legitimacy of these
ordinances has been litigated in four federal courts of appeals,
producing decisions that display an unusually diverse split of opinion.
Three different standards of review-from strict to minimum
scrutiny-have been applied to the equal protection claims raised in
the cases. Only two circuits agree on the standard of review to apply
to the equal protection claims, and those two disagree on the result.
Two circuits concluded that the fundamental parental right to rear
children protected by substantive due process was not implicated; the
other two seemed to think it was implicated but not infringed.
Woven throughout the cases are the problems of vagueness and,
depending on the sweep of the ordinance involved, free speech. The
result is a dissonant body of law that, were it music, would make even
the devoted fans of Arnold Schonberg cringe.
The first part of this essay is descriptive; it compares the
approaches taken by the four federal courts of appeals-the Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits-that have spoken to this issue. The
second part of this essay evaluates these various approaches and
offers some thoughts not only on the specific issue of juvenile curfews
but also on the larger issue of judicial enforcement of constitutionally
unenumerated rights.
I. A Tale of Four Circuits
A. The Fifth Circuit
In order to protect children from nocturnal dangers, reduce
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
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juvenile crime, and foster parental involvement in their children's
lives, the Dallas City Council in 1991 enacted a curfew ordinance that
made it a misdemeanor for persons under age seventeen "to use the
city streets or to be present at other public places within the city...
from 11 p.m. until 6 a.m. on week nights and from 12 midnight until 6
a.m. on weekends." 1 The ordinance did not apply to married or
emancipated persons, and excepted from its coverage persons under
age seventeen accompanied by a parent or guardian, on an errand for
a parent or guardian, in a motor vehicle traveling interstate or to or
from a place of employment, when present on the sidewalk in front of
their own or a neighbor's home, during an emergency, or when
involved in "employment related activities" or exercising their "First
Amendment speech and associational rights., 2 Parents of affected
teenagers filed suit in federal district court, challenging the
constitutional validity of the ordinance and seeking to enjoin its
enforcement.' After trial, the district court ruled that the ordinance
violated the Constitution's guarantees of equal protection and free
association, and permanently enjoined its enforcement.4 On appeal,
in Qutb v. Strauss,5 the Fifth Circuit reversed.
The Fifth Circuit assumed, but was careful not to hold, that the
right to move about freely is a fundamental right for purposes of the
equal protection clause.6 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals applied
strict scrutiny.' The court thought it almost self-evident that the state
had a "compelling interest in increasing juvenile safety and
decreasing juvenile crime."' The question then became whether the
ordinance was "narrowly tailored" to fit those compelling objectives.
"To be narrowly tailored, there must be a nexus between the stated
government interest and the classification created by the ordinance,
[such] 'that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was
illegitimate."' 9 Statistical evidence produced by the state to the effect
that most crime occurs during the nocturnal hours of the curfew was

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488,490 (5th Cir. 1993).
Id
See id. at 491.
See id.
Id at 496.
See Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492.
See id
Id. at 493.
Id., quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
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sufficient to establish the close fit required by strict scrutiny; the court
saw no need for the city to show that juvenile crime or juvenile
victimhood was closely associated with the curfew hours.'0 The court
also thought that the exceptions in the ordinance narrowed its scope
sufficiently that it was "the least restrictive means of accomplishing its
goals."'1
The parent-plaintiffs in Qutb claimed that the ordinance violated
"their fundamental right of privacy because it dictates the manner in
which their children must be raised."' 2 The court thought this claim
was overstated: "[T]his ordinance presents only a minimal intrusion
into the parents' rights [because] the only aspect of parenting that this
ordinance bears upon is the parents' right to allow the minor to
remain in public places, unaccompanied by a parent or guardian or
other authorized person, during the [curfew] hours."' 3 Parental
testimony that the ordinance interfered with the parental desire to
permit her college-bound daughter "the opportunity to learn to
manage her time and make decisions before going away to college
[was] insufficient to support the district court's finding that the
ordinance unconstitutionally infringed the liberty and privacy
interests of parents."' 4 The court did not discuss the city's
justifications for its "minimal intrusion" upon the parental liberty
interest, presumably because the court thought that the claimed
parental liberty interest was simply not implicated because the
ordinance interfered so insubstantially with the parental interest. 5
B. The Ninth Circuit

In 1947, San Diego enacted a juvenile curfew that made it
unlawful for anyone under age eighteen:
to loiter, idle, wander, stroll or play in or upon the public

streets, highways, roads, alleys, parks, playgrounds, wharves,
docks, or other public grounds, public places and public
buildings, places of amusement and entertainment, vacant lots
or other unsupervised places, between the hours of ten o'clock
P.M. and daylight immediately following.

The ordinance contained four exceptions: accompaniment by a
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See id. at 493.
Id.
Qutb, 11 F.3d at 495.
Id.
Id at 496.
Id. at 495-96.
Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 1997).
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parent, guardian, or authorized adult, performance of an emergency
errand dictated by a parent or other custodial adult, returning directly
home from a school-sponsored event, or activity connected with and
required by some legitimate business in which the minor is engaged.'
In 1994, the San Diego City Council resolved "to enforce the curfew
aggressively."1 8 A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of the
ordinance was brought in federal court by minors and their parents."
The district court granted summary judgment for the city of San
Diego." On appeal, in Nunez v. City of San Diego,21 the Ninth Circuit
reversed.
First, the court concluded that the nocturnal conduct prohibited
to minors by the ordinance-to "loiter, wander, idle, stroll, or play"was unconstitutionally vague and thus violated the due process
guarantee.2 The California courts had interpreted this phrase to
mean something narrower than mere presence but had failed to
explain adequately the difference.' The district court had treated the
phrase to refer to "hanging out," an activity that, according to the
district court, "requires a degree of aimlessness."2 4 Perhaps only in
California would the term "hanging out" be used as a legal term of
art; but it failed to impress the Ninth Circuit panel, which thought
that "'hanging out' and 'aimless conduct' ... are as inherently vague
as the phrase 'loiter, wander, idle, stroll or play' itself."' The Ninth
Circuit thought that the ordinance would not be unconstitutionally
vague if it prohibited "all juvenile nocturnal presence," but warned
that such a broad reading might "unconstitutionally burden the
[substantive] rights of minors and their parents." 26 Such a broad
reading of the San Diego ordinance was implausible, not only because
of the narrower construction provided by the California courts but
also because it would render at least three of the statutory exceptions
wholly superfluous, a fact that suggested that San Diego intended to

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. at 938-39.
Id. at 939.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 938.
Id. at 940-44.
See id- at 942.
Nunez, 114 F.3d at 941.
Id. at 941.
Id at 943.
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make criminal something less than mere presence.
Second, the court applied strict scrutiny to the plaintiffs' equal
protection claim.' Age, of course, is not a suspect classification, but
the court of appeals concluded that "[c]itizens have a fundamental
' and that minors are as entitled to that right
right of free movement,"29
as any other citizen. The fact that minors are constantly subject "'to
the control of their parents or guardians"'" was treated as irrelevant
to the question of whether minors possessed such a fundamental right
"vis-a-vis the state."'" But since "the State has somewhat broader
authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults" the
court found it necessary "to examine whether there is any significant
state interest in [regulating the free movement of minors] that is not
present in the case of an adult."32
33 the Supreme Court identified three reasons
In Bellotti v. Baird,
why the state might have a heightened interest in restricting the
freedom of minors more than adults: "(1) the peculiar vulnerability of
children, (2) their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and (3) the importance of the parental role in child
rearing." '
Those factors, said the Ninth Circuit, are relevant to
determining whether the state has a sufficiently compelling interest to
infringe the constitutionally fundamental liberty of minors in free
movement. 5 San Diego had a compelling interest in "protecting the
entire community from crime ' ' 16 and had a particularly "compelling
interest in reducing juvenile crime and juvenile victimization."37 But
the ordinance was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to accomplish
these interests. The Ninth Circuit required a stronger statistical
demonstration of the link between juvenile crime and victimization
and the curfew hours than the Fifth Circuit mandated in Qutb v.
Strauss." Moreover, the Ninth Circuit failed to provide enough
27.
28.
29.
30.
(1995).
31.

3233.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See id. at 941.
See id.
at 944-48.
Id. at 944.
Nunez, 114 F.3d at 944, quoting Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654
1& at 945.

It
443 U.S. 622 (1979).
Nunez, 114 F.3d at 945.
See iLat 945.
Idat 946.
Idat 947.
See Nunez, 114 F.3d at 948-49.
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exceptions for legitimate activities, with or without parental
permission. 9
Furthermore, the ordinance's failure to provide any exception
for fundamental First Amendment rights rendered the ordinance
The ordinance was subject to
unconstitutionally overbroad.'
overbreadth analysis because it "restricts access to any and all public
forums."4 Although the ordinance was content-neutral in its impact
on free expression, it was not "narrowly tailored to a significant
government interest."42 While the "physical and psychological wellbeing of minors is a compelling government interest,"" the near-total
and complete denial of minors' nocturnal access to public fora was
proof of its shabby tailoring to that objective. "[T]he ordinance is not
narrowly tailored because it does not sufficiently exempt legitimate
First Amendment activities from the curfew." 44
Finally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ordinance also
"violates the plaintiff parents' substantive due process rights.., to
The
rear children without undue governmental interference....
curfew is, quite simply, an exercise in sweeping state control
irrespective of parents' wishes., 45 Unlike valid laws that require a
minor to consult with a parent or obtain judicial approval prior to
terminating pregnancy short of term, the San Diego curfew in no
way supported parental authority to rear children. Under the
ordinance, "parents cannot allow their children to function
independently at night, 4which
some parents may believe is part of the
7
process of growing up.
C. The Fourth Circuit
In December, 1996, Charlottesville, Virginia adopted a juvenile
curfew ordinance that was virtually identical to the Dallas ordinance

39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 950.
42. Id. at 951, citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
43. Id., citing Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
44. Id.
45. Nunez, 114 F.3d at 951-952. The court also quoted Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417, 446-47 (1990): "The statist notion that governmental power should supersede
parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is
repugnant to the American tradition."
46. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,638-39 (1979).
47. Nunez, 114 F.3d at 952.
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upheld in Qutb v. Strauss.' A group of plaintiffs consisting of five
affected minors, a young adult who contended that the ordinance
interfered with his ability to associate with minors, and two parents of
affected minors challenged the constitutional validity of the ordinance
in federal district court.49 The district court sustained the validity of
the ordinance and, in Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville,5 the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court.5 '
In considering the plaintiffs' equal protection claims, the court
concluded that minors possess "qualified rights ... [but] do not
possess the same rights as adults." 52 Accordingly, "the ordinance
should be subject to less than the strictest level of scrutiny."5 3 It
should be no surprise that the court concluded that intermediate
scrutiny was "the most appropriate level of review. '
The interests that other circuits had found compellingreduction of juvenile crime and protection of juveniles from crimewere equally compelling to the Fourth Circuit. In addition, the court
concluded that Charlottesville's interest in "strengthen[ing] parental
Of course,
responsibility for children"'55 was also compelling.
intermediate scrutiny requires only that the government prove that its
objectives are "important;" the court's conclusion that these
objectives were compelling amounted to a dictum declaration that
strict scrutiny would also be satisfied as to the governmental interests
in imposing a curfew. 6 For the curfew ordinance to be "substantially
related" to the accomplishment of these important governmental
objectives, the court required Charlottesville to prove that the curfew
is "a meaningful step toward solving a real, not fanciful problem [by
demonstrating] 'that the recited harms are real, not merely
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms
in a direct and material way."' 57 The plaintiffs argued that the
ordinance was defective in scope, in that the failure to include

48. Compare Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 496-499 (5th Cir. 1993) with Schliefer v.
City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 852, 855-858 (4th Cir. 1998).
49. See Schliefer, 159 F.3d at 846.
50. See id. at 843.
51. See id. at 855.
52. Id at 847.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 849, quoting Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994).
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seventeen-year-old
minors
left
the
law
"impermissibly
underinclusive." s However, the court's reaction was to conclude, as
is commonly done under minimal scrutiny, that such judgments are
effectively immune from judicial review.5 ' The Schliefer Court stated:
[T]he City's decision to exclude seventeen-year-olds from
coverage under the curfew is a legislative judgment that we are
loath to second-guess... [The] City was forced to balance the
law enforcement benefit of subjecting seventeen-year-olds to
the curfew against the greater law enforcement burden of doing
so. Weighing benefits and burdens is what legislatures are
about.' °
Plaintiffs' arguments that the curfew was ineffective were equally
unavailing. The presence of statistical and anecdotal evidence
vouching for the utility of the ordinance, coupled with corroborating
testimony of local law enforcement officers, was enough to satisfy the
government's burden of proving that the ordinance would, in fact,
directly and materially contribute to the achievement of the
government's objectives.'
The claimed parental right "to direct their children's upbringing
without undue government interference"'62 was treated by the court as
too general to be useful. Perhaps heedful of the Supreme Court's
admonition that "we have required in substantive-due-process cases a
'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest," 63
one that is rooted in our national "history, legal traditions, and
practices [in order to] provide the crucial 'guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking' that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due
Process Clause,"' the Fourth Circuit concluded that a parental
interest in permitting "young children from remaining
unaccompanied on the streets late at night simply does not implicate
the kinds of intimate family decisions."' 5 This proposition was
recognized in such cases as Wisconsin v. Yoder,66 Stanley v. Illinois,6'
58. Id59. See id. at 850
60. Id
61. See Schliefer, 159 F.3d at 850-851.
62. Id at 852.
63. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,721 (1997).
64. Id
65. Schliefer, 159 F.3d at 853.
66. See 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing interest of parents of Old Order Amish
children to cease formal education for their children in violation of compulsory education
law because the law interfered with "traditional concepts of parental control over the
religious upbringing and education of their minor children").
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and Meyer v. Nebraska.6
Finally, the court concluded that the exception contained in the
ordinance
for "First
Amendment
activities"
was not
unconstitutionally vague, at least in the context of the facial challenge
presented. 69 "The First Amendment exception provides adequate
notice to citizens. It is perfectly clear that core First Amendment
activities such as political protest and religious worship after midnight
would be protected. It is equally clear that rollerblading would not.
Between these poles lie marginal cases, which can be taken as they
come." 70 The exceptions provided for participation in activities
sponsored by civic organizations and where a minor is involved in an
emergency were also regarded as adequately specific. The term "civic
organizations" was defined in the ordinance to include school and
religious organizations; that definition was an everyday use of the
term civic, sufficient to make the exception not an "ambiguity of
constitutional magnitude., 71 Similarly, "[w]hile 'there is little doubt
that imagination con conjure up hypothetical cases' to test the
meaning of emergency, these speculative musings do not render this
term unconstitutionally vague. '
D. The D.C. Circuit

In 1995, the District of Columbia Council adopted a juvenile
curfew ordinance nearly identical to the Dallas and Charlottesville
ordinances.' The ordinance was challenged by affected minors,
parents, and a private business.74 A federal district court granted
summary judgment to the plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of the
ordinance, concluding that the ordinance infringed upon the minors'
fundamental right to freedom of movement, the parents' fundamental
right to raise their children free of undue state interference, and was
67. See 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (recognizing "the interest of a parent in the
companionship, care, custody, and management" of his children as sufficient to defeat a
state presumption that an unmarried single father was an unfit parent).
68. See 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (recognizing "the natural duty [and implicit right] of the
parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life" as sufficient to void a
state law against teaching of foreign languages).
69. Schliefer, 159 F.3d at 853-55.
70. Id. at 854.
71. Id.
72. Id., quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,412 (1950).
73. Compare Qutb, 11 F.3d at 496-99 with Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 855-58 and with
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665, 681-84 (D.D.C. 1996).
74. See Hutchins v. Dist. of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1996)
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void for vagueness. 5 A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit affirmed,
but on rehearing en banc the D.C. Circuit, in Hutchins v. District of
Columbia,76 reversed the district court and upheld the validity of the
ordinance. 7 A plurality of the court, in an opinion by Judge
Silberman, thought "that the curfew implicates no fundamental rights
of minors or their parents, ' and a majority, also led by Judge
Silberman, concluded that "[e]ven assuming the curfew does
implicate such rights... it survives heightened scrutiny., 79 The level
of heightened scrutiny to which the majority subjected the ordinance
was intermediate scrutiny.' °
The plurality thought that there was no such thing as a
substantive fundamental right to free movement. That term is merely
"a synonym for the right to liberty," a right the invasion of which "is
constitutionally permissible if the person whose liberty has been
curtailed is afforded due process."'" The plurality agreed that there is
a well-established constitutional right to interstate travel,' but noted
that the right originated in "a concern over state discrimination
against outsiders rather than concerns over the general ability to
move about."" The foreign travel cases do not support the claim
because Haig v. Agee' characterized foreign travel as a liberty
"subject to reasonable government regulation within the bounds of
due process, whereas interstate travel is a fundamental right subject
to a more exacting standard.... Since the right to free movement
would cover both interstate and international travel, Agee at least
implies that the right recognized by the Court is decidedly more
narrow." 85
The vagrancy cases-Kolender v. Lawson and
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville'-were no more help. The
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
(1969).
83.
84.
actions
85.
86.
87.

See id. at 680.
188 F.3d. 531,534 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
See id. at 548.
Id. at 534.
Id.
See id. at 541.
Id. at 536.
See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
Hutchins, 188 F. 3d at 536.
453 U.S. 280 (1981) (upholding passport revocation where the holder's foreign
are causing or likely to cause serious injury to national security).
Hutchins, 188 F. 3d at 537.
461 U.S. 352 (1983).
405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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vagrancy ordinances struck down in those cases were voided for
vagueness. In the plurality's view, "[w]hile vagrancy statutes certainly

prohibit individuals from moving about, the constitutional infirmity in
these statutes is not that they infringe on a fundamental right of free
movement, but that they fail to give fair notice of conduct that is

forbidden and pose a danger of arbitrary enforcement [-] they do not
afford procedural due process."' Finally, the Supreme Court has
never held that there is a right of intrastate travel, and the federal

circuits are split on the issue.
The plurality also noted that the Supreme Court "has warned us
that our analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted
right for the more general is the right's description.., the easier is the
extension of substantive due process.... For that reason we must ask

not whether Americans enjoy a general right of free movement,
but.., do minors... have the right to freely wander the streetseven at night? ...We think that juveniles do not have a fundamental

right to be on the streets at night without adult supervision."' This
conclusion was bottomed not only on the "careful description"
admonition, but also on an extrapolation from Reno v. Flores,91 to the
effect that minors have no freestanding right to move about freely
because "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of

custody."' Moreover, the plurality thought it logically inconsistent to
recognize the claimed right when it has already been established that
governments may curb the freedom of movement of minors without
impinging on any fundamental constitutional rights through such
things as compulsory school attendance and child labor laws, and by
means that are "far more intrusive" than the curfew. Finally, the
88. Hutchins, 188 F. 3d at 537 (emphasis in original).
89. Compare King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971)
(concluding that a five year residency requirement for eligibility for municipal housing
infringed a right to intrastate travel) with Wardwell v. Bd. of Ed. of Cincinnati, 529 F.2d
625 (6h Cir. 1976) and Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F. 2d 900 (5h Cir. 1975) (both
rejecting a claimed fundamental right of intrastate travel). See also Lutz v. City of York,
899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990), the most germane case to this question, in which the Third
Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to void a municipal ordinance prohibiting "cruising,"
the repeated driving around a circuit of the public thoroughfares. The Third Circuit
believed that there was a right to move freely around one's place of residence.
90. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 538.
91. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
92. Id.at 302 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)).
93. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 539. The intrusive practices cited by the court that did not
even implicate any constitutionally fundamental rights were detention of deportable alien
minors (Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)), pretrial detention of juvenile delinquents
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plurality contended that "juvenile curfews were not uncommon early
in our history," 94 thus blunting any argument that juvenile freedom of
nocturnal movement is deeply rooted in our history and traditions.
The plurality rejected the claimed parental right to direct and
control their children's upbringing without undue state interference,
but not by the avenue of denying its existence. Rather, the plurality
thought that this constitutionally fundamental right was simply "not
implicated by the curfew."'95 Reasoning much like the Fourth Circuit
in Schliefer the plurality divined from the leading parental rights
cases-Meyer v. Nebraska,' Pierce v. Society of Sisters,98 and
Wisconsin v. Yoder 9 -the principle that the scope of the
constitutionally fundamental parental right is "focused on the
parents' control of the home and parents' interest in controlling...
the formal education of children."''" A parent's desire to determine
unilaterally "when and if children will be on the streets.., at night...
is not among the 'intimate family decisions' encompassed by such a
right.'11
A majority of the D.C. Circuit (including the Silberman
plurality) concluded, however, that "[e]ven if the curfew implicated
fundamental rights of children or their parents, it would survive
heightened scrutiny."'" The majority ruled that intermediate scrutiny
was the appropriate level of review because, while children possess
constitutional rights, "children's rights are not coextensive with those
of adults."'' 3 The Court relied on Prince v. Massachusetts," Bellotti v.
Baird,'05 and Carey v. Population Services International,°6 for this
where there was a serious risk of harm (Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)), prohibiting
children from street vending even when accompanied by a parent (Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)), and a ban on sale of material to minors that would
not be obscene if sold to adults (Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
94. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 539.
95. Id. at 540.
96. 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998).
97. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
98. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
99. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
100. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541.
101. Id. (quoting Schliefer, 159 F. 3d at 853).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
105. 443 U.S. at 635.
106. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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proposition, cases upholding restrictions on child labor, abortion
access without parental consultation, and contraceptive access. A
plurality of the Supreme Court, in Bellotti, asserted that "the State is
entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's
vulnerability;"' ' the D.C. court seized on this to conclude that "[t]his
means, at a minimum, that a lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate
when evaluating restrictions on minors' activities where their unique
vulnerability, immaturity, and need for parental guidance warrant
increased state oversight.""' Intermediate scrutiny followed almost
axiomatically, since "juveniles [can] be thought to be more vulnerable
to harm during curfew hours than adults,... they are less able to
make mature decisions in the face of peer pressure, and are more in
need of parental supervision during curfew hours."'" The ultimate
conclusion flowed inexorably, since the statistical evidence of juvenile
criminality and victimization in the District of Columbia during
curfew hours was significant. Most juvenile arrests occurred during
curfew hours, u° about a third of violent juvenile victimizations
occurred on the streets (presumably during curfew hours),"' and
juvenile arrests during curfew hours dropped by over one-third
during the first three months the curfew was in effect."2 Since the
government was "not obliged to prove a precise fit between the
nature of the problem and the legislative remedy-just a substantial
relation,.. 3 the court had no difficulty concluding that the evidence
"adequately supports the relationship between the government's
interest and the imposition of the curfew.""' 4
The majority also applied intermediate scrutiny to the parental
rights claim,"' presumably on the unarticulated theory that the
parental right to permit one's children to roam unaccompanied at
night is wholly derivative of the minor's claim to freedom of
movement. In the majority view, the D.C. "curfew passes
intermediate scrutiny because it is carefully fashioned much more to

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

443 U.S. 622,635 (1979).
Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541.
Id.
See id at 543.
See id. at 544.
See id.
Id. at 543.
Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 544.
See id. at 545.
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it.".. 6

enhance parental authority than to challenge
The court
acknowledged that "[i]f the parents' interests were in conflict with the
state's interests, we would be faced with a more difficult balancing of
sharply competing claims,"'' 7 but was convinced that no such conflict
was posed by the curfew. The exceptions to the curfew, almost all of
which were designed to confer upon parents "almost total discretion
over their children's activities during curfew hours,"' . preserved
"parental discretion to direct the upbringing of their children"
sufficiently [so] that the curfew did "not unconstitutionally infringe
on such rights."" 9
Finally, the majority made short work of the vagueness
contentions, concluding in much the same manner as the Fourth
Circuit in Schliefer that the exceptions for First Amendment
activities, for participation in activities sponsored by "a civic
organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the
minor," for presence on the sidewalk in front of one's own home or
that of a neighbor, and during an emergency, were all sufficiently
precise to inform a person of ordinary intelligence what conduct is
prohibited and what is permitted.12 This conclusion was no doubt
buttressed by the fact that the challenge to the curfew law was a facial
one.
E. A Merry-go-Round the Circuits.

Four circuits have considered the question of whether minors
possess a fundamental right of free movement. The Fifth Circuit and
a plurality of the D.C. Circuit think that such a right does not exist;
the Fourth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits think it does, but the circuits have
split on the appropriate level of review. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits
applied strict scrutiny,' but they reached different conclusions
concerning two very different curfew laws. The Fourth and D.C.
Circuits applied intermediate scrutiny and both these courts of
appeals ruled that the government had sustained its burden of
justification of virtually identical curfew laws.
Two circuits - the Fifth and Fourth - and a plurality of the D.C.
116. Id.

117. Id.
118.
119.
120.
121.
holding

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 546.
Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 546-48.
The Fifth Circuit assumed the existence of the right, but studiously avoided
that it did in fact exist. See text following note 3, supra.
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Circuit believe that juvenile curfew laws that exempt parental
controlled juvenile nocturnal presence do not even implicate a
parental right to rear children without undue government
interference. This is because those courts think that the specific
manifestation of the right - parental acquiescence in the uncontrolled
nocturnal public presence of their children - is outside the scope of
the constitutionally recognized parental right to rear children without
undue state interference. The Ninth and D.C. Circuits are of the
opinion that such curfew laws do implicate such a parental right, but
they differ as to the level of scrutiny to apply and as to the outcome of
that scrutiny. The Ninth Circuit, applied strict scrutiny and struck
down the San Diego curfew ordinance before it; the D.C. Circuit
applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the D.C. ordinance. In a
striking difference of opinion produced partly by the differing laws,
the Ninth Circuit regarded the San Diego curfew as a pure
superceding of parental authority while the D.C. Circuit regarded the
D.C. ordinance as supportive of that authority.
The circuits views on vagueness are more uniform. The Ninth
Circuit found unconstitutionally vague a curfew law with few
exceptions that sought to ban such imprecise activities as loitering,
wandering, idleness, strolling, or playing. The remaining circuits were
confronted with curfew laws that banned all nocturnal public
presence of affected minors save that included within a host of
specific exceptions. All of these circuits agreed that the exceptions,
though perhaps not a model of clarity, were clear enough to let the
ordinary person know what conduct was permitted and what was
prohibited.
We are left with a jagged division over whether a right of free
movement exists, for anyone and particularly for minors, another
division concerning the generality with which such a right should be
stated, and a final division over the level of review to bring to curfew
laws that circumscribe the free movement of minors late at night. An
equally rough division exists on the question of whether the
constitutionally fundamental right of parents to control their
children's upbringing is even implicated by curfew laws that contain
exemptions for parentally controlled nocturnal activities of minors,
and also with respect to the subsidiary question of what level of
review to apply to curfew laws that curb unlimited parental discretion
to let their children do what they please during the hours of darkness.
The resolution of these issues says much about our discourse
concerning fundamental rights. I offer some thoughts on that topic in
the next section.
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II. As Much Liberty as the Law Allows
The intractable problem of unenumerated rights is definitional.
To be sure, there are those who deny the validity of any
unenumerated rights, but that contention is really an argument about
the scope of such rights, since unenumerated rights are always
connected, however tenuously, to some sliver of constitutional text.
The argument is mostly about the generality with which such rights
are to be stated. One explicit pole in that debate was staked out by
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist in a footnote to the
majority opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.," in which they asserted
that fundamental rights must be defined at "the most specific level at
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the
asserted right can be identified.""
No other justice joined this
footnote, however, and it sparked an impassioned dissent from
Justice Brennan, who characterized it as stemming from a conception
of the Constitution as a "stagnant, archaic, hidebound document
steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time long past.""12
While this approach has never explicitly commanded a majority of the
Court, there is reason to think a softer version has slipped into the
pantheon of stare decisis. When the Court, in Washington v.
Glucksberg," declared that an asserted fundamental right must be
"carefully described" it implicitly demanded that such rights be stated
at some uncertain level of specificity. Of course, the phrase is so
Delphic that almost any level of generality (or specificity) can be
accommodated, so long as the description of the general right is a
model of care, but that, I suspect, is not what the majority of the
Court intended. 6
The spectrum of debate in the courts of appeals, and particularly
within the D.C. Circuit, spans the gamut of whether a claimed right of
122. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
123. I. at 127 n.6.
124. Id at 141-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
126. It is sheer speculation to say that the phrase represents a practical compromise
between the advocates of rigid specificity-Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist and
(probably) Justice Thomas-and the advocates of a more flexible and temperate approach
to the definition of fundamental rights, but who are nevertheless sympathetic to the
perceived need to cabin the growth of amorphous and potentially all-encompassing rights.
In the latter category probably reside Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, and perhaps other
members of the Court. Reading the tea leaves of the Court is fun but dangerous. The
reader is advised to take this footnote subject to the doctrine, now outmoded virtually
everywhere else in law, of caveatemptor.
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free movement should be phrased (most specifically) as a right of
juveniles to be at large in public late at night without legitimate
purpose, as a right of juveniles to be at large in public late at night, as
a right of free movement of juveniles, and (most generally) as a right
of free movement. The most specific tradition argument of Justices
Scalia and Rehnquist would ask whether there is a tradition of
permitting minors freedom to roam at will at night or whether there is
a clear tradition of denying minors that freedom. In the absence of
any such tradition, in either direction, the relevant question would
become whether there is a tradition of permitting (or denying) minors
freedom of movement. This is, of course, an inquiry that is largely
bounded by history, but history is supposed to be our lodestar for
identification of fundamental unenumerated rights.
History,
however, does not necessarily rule the present, however important it
is to converse regularly with the past.
While we are parsing our traditions to locate useful specific
traditions, we ought to be mindful of why we are doing. It is both to
determine whether there is any such right embedded in our legal and
social culture and to define such rights as do exist so that we can
assess the government's justifications for their abrogation. The
rigidly specific approach to unenumerated rights focuses exclusively
on the first objective; the overly general approach focuses entirely on
the latter objective. There is no virtue in creating constitutionally
fundamental rights in the absence of any cultural tradition
recognizing them, past or present, because that simply substitutes
judicial discretion for legislative choice. I do not propose to travel
again the worn path of debate over the degree to which the judiciary
is anti-democratic; I take it as more or less established that the
judiciary has no business trumping the judgments of the
democratically elected representatives of the people unless there is a
sound constitutional basis for doing so. With respect to unenumerated
rights, some cultural tradition ought to support their existence before
judges use them to veto the presumptively valid work of the people's
representatives. But surely that is not the end of the matter. If we
frame the claimed right so specifically that it subsumes into the
definition of the right the very factors that are critical to justification
of government limitations upon the ostensible right, we have
imploded analysis in a fashion that is not conducive to responsible
constitutional development.
To illustrate, consider the various forms of the movement right at
issue in the juvenile curfew cases. If the putative right is couched as a
right of juveniles to move about freely at night without adult
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supervision, the reasons why the government might wish to limit this
right - to reduce juvenile crime and juvenile victimization by
criminals - become framed as reasons why juveniles do not possess
such a right in the first instance. If the asserted right is reformulated
as a right of juveniles to move about freely, the reasons why the
government might wish to limit that right - to protect a vulnerable
group not always possessed of sound judgment - become needlessly
embroiled in argument over whether the right exists at all. As Judge
Rogers stated, in a partial dissent and partial concurrence in
Hutchins, "age should not be an element of the right at issue because
the state interests that are relevant at the balancing stage of analysis
do not aid... inquiry at the definitional stage."127 Moreover,
bifurcation of whatever movement right that may exist into an adult
right and a juvenile right implicitly assumes that the two rights are
distinct, albeit related, as two different species of the same genus.
Homo sapiens and Homo habilis may be related, but the two are
distinctly different. Is there any relevant difference between a
juvenile's interest in free movement and an adult's interest in free
movement? In other words, is freedom of movement a genus of right,
such that two different classes of people have different interests in its
possession, and thus claim a different species of the right? One can
imagine such rights. The right to terminate pregnancy prior to
viability means considerably more to a pregnant woman than to her
physician, or her male partner. But are there any such relevant
differences between an adult's interest in moving about in public
unmolested by the police, and a teenager's interest in the same thing?
To ask the question is to answer it. The arguments supporting the
conclusion that a teenager has a lesser interest in moving about freely
are arguments, however sound, that focus upon the state's interests in
controlling that free movement. Such considerations are simply not
relevant to the antecedent question of how to define a claimed right
in order to determine whether it is constitutionally fundamental.
A characteristic of modern fundamental rights discourse is to
treat the fundamental right as non-existent until the government has
substantially infringed the right. The right to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy prior to viability is fundamental, but not so fundamental
that it cannot be duly burdened."
The right to marriage is
fundamental, but not so fundamental that its exercise cannot be used

127. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 555 (Rogers, J.,
dissenting and concurring).
128. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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as the basis for denial for welfare benefits.'29 The same holds true for
the parental right to control the manner of the raising of one's
children. It may be fundamental, but not so fundamental that a
"minimal intrusion" upon that right will trigger any heightened
scrutiny.1" If fundamental rights are truly fundamental, they ought to
retain that character consistently. A government may have adequate
justification for infringing such rights, but the state ought to be
required to prove that justification whenever a fundamental right is
infringed. Instead, the state's interest in protecting potential human
life, as manifested by a 24-hour waiting period before obtaining a previability abortion or any other "duly burdensome" regulation,
operates to depress the asserted right to some quasi-fundamental or
non-fundamental status. This must be so, or the state would be
required to prove that the infringement is necessary to achieve a
compelling interest. Of course, the undue burden standard requires
nothing of the sort.31
Much the same thing seems to be happening with the parental
right to rear one's children free of undue state interference. Indeed,
even the definition of the right leaves open considerable territory for
state interference with the parental design for children. When the
courts of appeals declare that the curfew laws are minimal intrusions
upon the parental right and thus the government action need not be
justified under any level of heightened scrutiny they are treating the
parental right as non-existent. It may well be the case that juvenile
curfew laws are justified, at least under intermediate scrutiny, because
they are supportive of parental authority, but that argument must be
made at the justification stage, not as part of a process of
characterizing the injury as so minor as not to require justification.
The level of generality at which the scope of the parental right
should be defined should be decided, not by reference to historical
tradition alone, but also by reference to our cultural traditions. For
example, it is a common cultural assumption that parents will
129. See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
130. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488,495-96 (5th Cir. 1993).
131. It might be argued that "duly burdensome" abortion regulations are so minimal
an impediment to abortion that they do not constitute an infringement at all. That gambit
simply substitutes judicial evaluation of the magnitude of the harm to the right-holder for
examination of the government's justification. Of course, some state-originated burdens
on the exercise of fundamental rights are so trivial that government justification is
virtually self-evident. Assuming the existence of a right of free movement, the familiar
stop sign or traffic signal is surely an example of a trivial interference that is so obviously
justified it hardly merits consideration.
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command their children to go to bed at an hour dictated by the
parent, but nobody would think that the state has any legitimate
power to command adults to go to bed at an hour dictated by the
state. Now suppose a government enacts legislation that requires all
children under age ten to be in bed by 8 p.m. each weeknight. Does
this law infringe upon a constitutionally fundamental parental right to
rear one's children free from state interference? Of course it does,
and part of the reason why is that the state could not dictate the same
behavior to adults. Could a state require every child to be immunized
against measles? It could, and part of the reason why is that it could
also demand the same behavior from adults. In short, one way of
focusing on the scope of the parental right is to ask whether the
juvenile behavior the government regulates is equally susceptible to
regulation when engaged in by adults. If it is not, it should be
presumed that the behavior is for the parent's discretion, not the
state's. That presumption can be overcome, but it should be
overcome by adequate proof of the government's heightened interest
in regulating the juvenile behavior in question, and the necessity of
this particular regulation to achieving those goals. Thus, it should be
a constitutionally fundamental liberty interest of parents to decide
whether their minor children can be trusted to be on the streets late
at night, but the government should have an opportunity to justify its
invasion of that right. But it would not be a constitutionally
fundamental liberty interest of parents to decide whether their
children may smoke marijuana, or imbibe alcoholic beverages,
because those activities are equally susceptible to government
regulation when engaged in by adults.
This principle is consistent with the existing scope of the parental
right. An adult's constitutional liberties would be infringed by a law
prohibiting him from procuring private education132 or learning a
foreign language, 33 or a law requiring him to attend school or work."
Pierce, Meyer, and Yoder mark out substantive rights, but also a
domain of presumptive parental control.
You may ask why it is necessary to focus on the parental right at
all, since the scope of the parental right is formed by the scope of
fundamental rights generally. The answer is that the state may have
different justifications for infringing the juvenile's substantive liberty
interests and infringing the close kin of the parental right to rear
132. Cf Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
133. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
134. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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children. An example can be seen in the juvenile curfew cases. The
government justifications for overriding the juvenile's rights to
freedom of movement center on the importance of preventing
juvenile crime and juvenile victimization, and the presumed
vulnerability and less keen judgment possessed by juveniles. The
state's justifications for infringing the parental right to make decisions
about their children's welfare center on the importance of supporting
parents in exercising responsible control over the nocturnal
movements of children. Those are distinctly different, albeit related,
interests, and it is conceivable that a court might conclude that the
state is justified in infringing the minor's right of freedom of
movement but lacks justification to invade the parental right.
Perhaps this is a distinction without a difference, but analytic clarity
seems to require the distinction. Moreover, the distinction might
make a subtle difference. Suppose that a Dallas-type juvenile curfew,
containing multiple exceptions for many (but not all) parentally
authorized juvenile activities, was upheld against a minor's assertion
that it violates his freedom of movement, but struck down because it
impermissibly infringes the parents' right of child-rearing. The
legislative reaction might well be a juvenile curfew with an omnibus
exception that permits any juvenile nocturnal public presence so long
as the juvenile is authorized by the parent to be out and about.
Surely this would not infringe the parental right. The result would be
to push governments to recognize that parents have the primary right
to govern their children's otherwise lawful activities.
What level of scrutiny should apply to the juvenile's right to free
movement and to the parental right to control a juvenile's free
movement?
The Fourth and D.C. Circuit's application of
intermediate scrutiny is premised upon the idea that juveniles possess
only fledgling constitutional rights. That conclusion is disturbing. It
is not entirely consistent with precedent, and leads to the possibility
that governments can control juveniles in an authoritarian fashion
that would be impermissible with respect to adults.
While it is true that such cases as Bellotti v. Baird focus on the
state interests in regulating juvenile behavior - "the peculiar
vulnerability of children, their inability to make critical decisions in
an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role
in child rearing"'35 - it is important to remember that this is a
recitation of state interests that might be sufficient to warrant an

135. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,634 (1979).
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infringement of constitutional liberties. It is not a statement of
reasons why juveniles do not possess full constitutional rights.
Indeed, a host of cases have held or implied that juveniles possess
unqualified constitutional rights."6 The fact that the Court has
simultaneously stated that "the state's authority over children's
activities is broader than over like actions of adults,"'37 and that the
constitutional "rights of minors are not 'co-extensive with those of
adults,"" can suggest one of two things: minors enjoy qualified,
diluted constitutional rights or the government's case for justification
of invasion of a minor's constitutional rights will typically be stronger
than with respect to an adult. The former conclusion is an implicit
repudiation of the long line of cases that have recognized, explicitly or
implicitly, the unqualified constitutional rights of minors. Moreover,
that conclusion rests on the implausible fiction that minors have less
interest in their constitutional liberties than do adults. They may have
less ability to assert them or less ability to appreciate their existence,
but they are no less precious. The sound conclusion is that the
government has a host of reasons for invading minors' constitutional
rights that it does not possess with respect to adults. That is very
likely the case, and there is no reason the government should not
advance those interests. If the reasons are sound, and the means the
government has chosen are well-calculated to achieve those interests,
the government will have sustained its burden of justification. Let it
do so, but let us not load the dice in favor of government regulation
of juveniles by reducing the level of scrutiny because the government
has good reasons for invading the constitutional rights of juveniles.
"Your Honor, the government has good reasons for regulating the
nocturnal behavior of juveniles, and because we have good reasons,
you should relieve us from the burden of thoroughly proving them."
Would any law professor accept that logic from his or her students?
Shouldn't lawyers and judges be held to at least as high a standard as
law students and professors?

136. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (equal protection); Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975) (due process); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (equal
protection); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-68 (1970) (due process); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,511 (1969) (speech rights); In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 13, 28 (1967) (due process and other criminal procedural rights); Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (equal protection); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (speech and religion rights).
137. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975).
138. Id at 214 n.11 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. 503,515 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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MI. Conclusion
The juvenile curfew cases raise large questions about how we
define fundamental liberty interests and what level of review courts
bring to the problem of invasion of those interests. The curfew cases
also raise serious and disturbing issues of the quantum of
constitutional protection we will extend to our sons and daughters.
The four circuit courts of appeals that have decided these issues
display a remarkable fragmentation concerning the method of
defining the existence and scope of the rights asserted and an equally
large cleavage concerning the appropriate level of review to use in
determining the constitutional validity of these curfew laws.
Fundamental rights ought to be phrased at the lowest level of
generality consistent with both our historical and cultural traditions,
to the extent that level is not so specific that it denies the equal
interest in enjoyment of the right that may in fact exist by different
classes of people. In the case of a claimed freedom of movement,
there is no difference between the interest in enjoyment of that right
by an adult and a juvenile. There may well be significant differences
in the state's interest in infringing a juvenile's or an adult's exercise of
that right, but those differences are relevant at the justification stage,
not at the definitional stage.
The scope of the fundamental right of parents to control the
upbringing of their children has much to do with the scope of the
government's legitimate power to control all behavior, adult or
juvenile. To the extent that a government could not constitutionally
regulate any given adult behavior, a presumption should attach that
governmental attempts to regulate that same behavior, when engaged
in by juveniles, encroaches upon the constitutionally protected zone
of parental discretion in raising children. Of course, governments
may have excellent reasons for invading that zone, but those reasons
should be advanced at the justification stage.
The application of intermediate scrutiny to these claimed rights
represents an admission, contrary to precedent and logic, that
juveniles simply do not possess unqualified constitutional rights.
Intermediate scrutiny is a way of counting twice the government's
reasons for infringing a juvenile's constitutional liberties. I think that
governments are already powerful enough, and do not need any
additional help to skew the system in their favor. I suspect that most
juveniles feel the same way.
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